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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, 2005-2006
ICO Global Commc'ns (Holdings) Ltd. v. FCC, 428 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir.
2005)
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") was
within its power to automatically revoke a mobile spectrum license due to fail-
ure to comply with the first milestone requirement, entering into a "non-
contingent" satellite-manufacturing agreement, imposed by the FCC.
Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
FCC action, finding no due process violation, no discretionary denial of a
waiver problem, and no need for a hearing prior to revoking the licenses. The
court also agreed with the FCC's determination that the agreements in question
did not meet the first milestone requirement imposed on spectrum licensees.
Using factors articulated in In re Applications of Tempo Enterprises, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.R. 20 (Sept. 26, 1986), the court
held that the agreement did not truly commit either Constellation Communica-
tions Holdings, Inc. ("Constellation") or Mobile Communications Holdings,
Inc. ("Mobile") to actually implement the satellite system and, therefore, they
did not meet the first milestone requirement.
Discussion: In July 2001, the FCC granted a license for mobile satellite ser-
vice in the 2 GHz band to ICO Global Communications (Holdings) Ltd.
("ICO"), Constellation, Mobile, and other firms. In February 2003, the FCC
announced that ICO had passed the first milestone as a result of its satellite-
construction contract with Boeing Satellite Systems International, Inc. ("Boe-
ing"). Before the year deadline, Constellation and Mobile entered into a set of
satellite-sharing agreements with ICO by which Constellation and Mobile were
to purchase title to channels on ICO's satellites. The court noted the purpose of
the milestone requirements imposed by the FCC on spectrum licensees is to
"ensure speedy delivery of service to the public" and to "prevent warehousing
of valuable orbital locations and spectrum." Warehousing is seen both in terms
of impeding prompt delivery and allowing a licensee to block entry by others
willing and able to proceed with construction and launch satellite systems. The
first milestone requires licensees to enter into "non-contingent" satellite-
manufacturing agreements within one year of receiving their licenses. Addi-
tional milestone requirements are weighed at later points in order to assess
progress in constructing and launching the satellites. The enforcement mecha-
nism for failure to comply with the milestone requirements is automatic can-
cellation.
The FCC's International Bureau determined that the agreements in question
did not constitute non-contingent satellite-construction contracts, thereby de-
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claring the licenses null and void. In re Applications of Mobile Communica-
tions Holdings, Inc. and ICO Global Communications (Holdings) Ltd., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 1094, 1103 (Jan. 29, 2003). The FCC
decision did four things: (i) affirmed the International Bureau's conclusion
regarding the first milestone; (2) rejected the argument that FCC precedent
provided insufficient notice of limits the FCC was placing on sharing agree-
ments made to meet the first milestone; (3) affirmed the International Bureau's
denial of a waiver request; and (4) rejected the argument that it had violated 47
U.S.C. § 312 by failing to provide a hearing before canceling licenses. In re
Joint Application for Review of Constellation Communications Holdings, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 11,631 (June 9, 2004).
ICO, Constellation, and Mobile appealed the FCC's decision, renewing their
four arguments: (1) that the agreements did meet the first milestone; (2) that
even if the agreement did not meet the first milestone requirement, they had
insufficient notice of the limits used by the FCC on the ability of sharing
agreements to meet the first milestone; (3) that the denial of a waiver request
was improper; and (4) that the FCC did not comply with 47 U.S.C. § 312 by
failing to provide a hearing.
The court determined that the FCC was correct in its determination that the
agreements in question did not meet the first milestone. The FCC articulated a
number of factors from an earlier order, In re Application of Tempo Enter-
prises, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.R. 20 (Sept. 26, 1986),
which demonstrated that a satellite licensee had successfully met the first mile-
stone. The FCC maintained, and the court agreed, that the key problem with
the sharing agreements in question were that they did not illustrate a firm com-
mitment to implement the proposed satellite system: (1) Constellation and Mo-
bile only paid less than one-half of one percent of the total purchase price; (2)
the agreements did not require additional payments until ICO's satellites were
launched; (3) consequences of breach were weak at best; (4) the agreements
gave Constellation and Mobile no leverage to ensure Boeing completed con-
struction or that ICO would follow through with transfer of capacity; and (5)
ICO could pull out at virtually any time.
The court also upheld the FCC's rejection of the insufficient notice argu-
ment. The Court explains that in at least one preceding order, the FCC identi-
fied "the basic foundation for demonstrating compliance" with the first mile-
stone. In re Applications of United States Satellite Broadcasting Co., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 7247, 7250 (Oct. 21, 1992). The Court
articulated the due process notice standard: if a regulated party acting in good
faith can identify, with ascertainable certainty, the standards with which the
agency expects parties to conform then there is no due process violation. The
court found no such violation here.
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Additionally, the court upheld the FCC's decision to deny a waiver of the
first milestone requirement. The court explained the review for such a denial is
limited-vacating is possible only when the agency's reasons are so insubstan-
tial as to render the denial an abuse of discretion. Public interest is one reason
the FCC can exercise its discretion to waive a rule. The court found a sound
public policy reason for denying the waiver: it "would establish a precedent
that would undercut efforts to limit warehousing of scare orbit and spectrum
resources."
The court also rejected the argument that the FCC cancellation without an
order to show cause and without an evidentiary hearing violated 47 U.S.C. §
312. Section 312(a) permits the FCC to revoke a license for seven reasons and
§ 312(c) requires an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing before
revocation. Appellants argued that the cancellation order rests not on any of the
seven reasons and therefore lacks any statutory foundation. The court does not
agree that § 312 is the sole means for termination. The Court also notes that
under § 312(c) a hearing is unnecessary where it would be pointless, such as
when the matter turns solely on issues of policy. The Court finds the FCC was
within its powers to automatically revoke the license.
Summary by Rosemary Hartmann
Kidd Commc'ns v. FCC, 427 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
Issue: Whether, in approving the transfer of a radio station license from
Kidd Communications ("Kidd") to Paradise Communications ("Paradise"), the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") properly
explained that the seller retained a reversionary security interest in the license,
and whether the Commission appropriately accounted for its established legal
policy by accommodating the state court decision in its ruling.
Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the FCC provided inadequate explanations regarding why the relevant
state commercial and contract interests deviated with federal policies of ac-
commodating state court decisions. Specifically, the court pointed to the
Commission's failure to apply its established policy that both prohibits sellers
from retaining reversionary interests in radio station licenses and from main-
taining security interests in broadcasting licenses. Further, the court noted that
the Commission neglected to reconcile its regulations with the competing poli-
cies of accommodating state court decisions and serving the public interest.
The Commission's decision was vacated and remanded to the Commission for
further proceedings.
Discussion: This appeal arose from the original suit brought by Paradise
against Kidd for breach of contract and specific performance resulting from its
default on payments in a radio station purchase. Kidd's execution of an origi-
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nal promissory note pledged to Paradise "all of the station assets, including
broadcasting and office equipment, goodwill and receivables," but specifically
excluded "any FCC licenses." Upon Kidd's first default on the note, a super-
seding promissory note was drafted providing that, in the event of a default,
both parties "agree to act reasonably and in good faith to effect an orderly
turnover of the station to Paradise."
After Kidd refused to surrender the property when a second default oc-
curred, the California Superior Court ordered the company to execute an appli-
cation transferring the station's license to Paradise, despite conflicting argu-
ments as to the parties' intent under the two notes. Upon Kidd's refusal to
comply, the court appointed a trustee and executed the application on Kidd's
behalf, after which Kidd sought Commission review. The Commission subse-
quently denied Kidd's request, approving the transfer to Paradise. Kidd then
appealed the FCC's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
Kidd claimed that the decision to assign the station's license gave effect to
an impermissible reversionary interest, which was inconsistent with FCC regu-
lations under 47 C.F.R. § 73.1150. Additionally, Kidd maintained that the de-
cision was contrary to Commission precedent and policy prohibiting license
holders from issuing security interests in broadcast licenses, as opposed to the
station's physical assets.
Although the court agreed that the FCC is entitled to even greater deference
than agency interpretations of statutes when interpreting its own regulations
under Chevron, it contradicted the Commission's determination that past ap-
plications of § 73.1150 were factually distinguishable because they involved
contracts executed in connection with license assignments or station transfers.
The court noted that underlying policies and precedent apply to any security
interests in broadcasting licenses, and the FCC's control-based rationale of the
regulation was not uniquely applicable to reversionary interests acquired at the
time of station transfers.
The court pointed to previous FCC decisions with direct language that re-
versionary interests are unenforceable, emphasizing the Commission's deter-
minations that "no right of reversion can attach to a broadcast station license,
and the license, as distinguished from a station's physical assets, is not subject
to a mortgage, security interest, or lien." In re Applications of KIRK Merkley,
Receiver; For Involuntary Assignment of License of Station KPRQ, Murray,
Utah., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 829 (June 29, 1983).
The court rebutted the Commission's contention that prior decisions are dicta
and thus persuasive, noting that these discussions clearly articulated reasons




Finally, the court held that the Commission's dual reasoning that the sta-
tion's transfer was consistent with the FCC's long-standing policies of ac-
commodating state court decisions, and serving the public interest by returning
the station to broadcast operations was "simply inadequate." The court noted
that the Commission is not required to accommodate state court decrees that
are contrary to Commission policy. The FCC's policy had clearly reflected an
aversion to allowing security interests and reversionary rights in station li-
censes. The FCC had never previously indicated that public interest considera-
tions might override policies against security interests. Doing so now would
create a loophole that could cause station licenses and physical assets to be-
come indistinguishable. Commission precedent has required that broadcast
licenses be treated distinctly, a position supported by Communications Act
provisions that allow for licensing to provide for channel usage but not station
license or ownership outright. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-310.
Given the FCC's previous policy against security interests and reversionary
rights in station licenses, the court found that the Commission failed to ade-
quately reconcile the state commercial and contract interests in this case with
its established federal policies and regulations.
Summarized by Kaethe M Carl
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. FCC, 437 F.3d
1206 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has jurisdiction to review a FCC licensing decision beyond the thirty-day
filing period, established under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b), when the original petition
involves a waiver issue which could be appealed within a period of sixty days
under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a).
Holding: Because the Commission's decision to grant waiver was a "logi-
cally necessary prerequisite" to its licensing decision, the court held both deci-
sions to be an "inseparable whole, challengeable (if at all) only under §
402(b)."
Discussion: The North American Catholic Educational Programming Foun-
dation ("Foundation") applied for an Instructional Television Fixed Services
("ITFS") license in order to broadcast educational cultural programming to the
Henderson, Nevada market. The FCC issued a public notice asking for compet-
ing applications. The Clark County School District ("CCSD") responded with
their submission. Along with their application, CCSD filed a waiver because it
already owned eight ITFS licenses in the Henderson, Nevada market-four
more than allowed under FCC regulations. Ultimately, CCSD was granted the
waiver and the license.
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Thirty-two days after the FCC released its order, the Foundation filed notice
of appeal regarding the licensing decision pursuant to § 402(b). However, after
discovering that § 402(b) only permitted appeals filed with the court within
thirty days of the FCC's final order, the Foundation pursued review of the de-
cision pursuant to § 402(a). Section 402(a) governs all other final orders and
allows appeals to be made within sixty days of a final order. The Foundation
argued that the FCC issued two separate decisions that were separately review-
able under § 402(a) and § 402(b). The court disagreed with the Foundation's
position.
First, the waiver petition is ancillary to the larger licensing proceeding. As a
result, the waiver decision should not consummate the agency's decision-
making process. Second, while § 402 describes two mutually exclusive chan-
nels for the review of FCC decisions, Congress specifically provided § 402(b)
to govern decisions and orders affecting licensing. Third, § 402(a), clarified
through 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1), applies exclusively to final orders. In this case, a
"waiver decision" is not a final order.
Summarized by James A. Daniels
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2006)
Issue: Whether Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. violated the First
Amendment when he banned all executive branch employees from communi-
cating with two Baltimore Sun ("Sun") journalists in retaliation for their critical
reporting on the Ehrlich administration.
Holding: The Court affirmed the district court decision that Governor Ehr-
lich's directive in response to the journalists' reporting did not give rise to an
actionable First Amendment free speech retaliation claim.
Discussion: On November 18, 2004, Governor Ehrlich issued a directive
forbidding executive branch employees from speaking or otherwise interacting
with Baltimore Sun reporters David Nitkin and Michael Olesker. Governor
Ehrlich explicitly indicated he issued this directive in response to the pair's
coverage of Ehrlich's administration. Other Sun reporters continued to enjoy
unfettered access to the Ehrlich administration. The Sun sought a preliminary
injunction and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that such gov-
ernment action unconstitutionally chilled the reporters' exercise of their First
Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland granted Ehrlich's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In affirming the district court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit drew a distinction between government restrictions on free
speech that are "actionable, on the one hand, and a de minimis inconvenience,
on the other.". A de minimis government free speech restriction includes in-
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stances when "the challenged government action, whether conduct or speech,
is so pervasive, mundane, and universal in government operations that allow-
ing a plaintiff to proceed on his retaliation claim would 'plant the seed of a
constitutional case' in 'virtually every' interchange." The rationale for limiting
First Amendment retaliation causes of action is "to balance government and
private interests so as not to impose liability in everyday, run-of-the-mill en-
counters." Noting that it is common practice for government officials to "dis-
advantage some reporters because of their reporting and simultaneously advan-
tage others by granting them unequal access to nonpublic information," the
Court determined that "the adverse impact of such conduct is objectively de
minimis." As such, the appellate court declined to reverse the district court de-
cision and held that "in the circumstances of this case, no actionable retaliation
claim arises when a government official denies a reporter access to discretion-
arily afforded information or refuses to answer questions."
Notably, the Fourth Circuit's opinion stands in contrast to the 1977 U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opinion Sherrill v.
Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Sherrill, a reporter was denied a
White House press pass by the U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service based
its decision on the fact that the reporter had a prior assault conviction, but re-
fused to reveal its reasoning at the time. The reporter brought suit, contending
that denial of the press pass infringed upon his First Amendment right to free
speech and Fifth Amendment right to due process. The D.C. Circuit held that
although the Secret Service did not need to articulate detailed standards for
granting or denying press passes to a reporter, it did need to provide "notice,
opportunity to rebut, and a written decision" because "denial of a pass poten-
tially infringes upon [F]irst [A]mendment guarantees." Sherrill, 569 F.2d at
128.
The D.C. Circuit, in contrast to the 4th Circuit in Ehrlich, held that "restric-
tion[s] on newsgathering [must] be no more arduous than necessary, and that
individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information."
Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129-30. The D.C. Circuit placed particular emphasis on
the fact that the White House "voluntarily decided to establish press facilities
for correspondents" that are "perceived as being open to all bona fide Wash-
ington-based journalists." Id. at 129. Although the Sherrill and Ehrlich opin-
ions turn on slightly different fact patterns, it is nonetheless notable that the
D.C. Circuit held that the First and Fifth Amendment interests of the reporter
were so compelling that the Secret Service must "provide notice of the factual
bases for [press pass] denial, an opportunity for the applicant to respond to
these, and a final written statement of the reasons for denial." Id. at 130-31. In
Ehrlich, the 4th Circuit appears to give far more deference to government deci-
sions to curtail or deny a journalist's access to information and far less weight
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
to the First Amendment free speech claims of affected reporters.
Summarized by James Weiss
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005)
Issues: (1) Whether peer-to-peer ("P2P") downloading of copyrighted mate-
rial constitutes "fair use" under 17 U.S.C. § 107. (2) Whether a P2P
downloader of copyrighted material can qualify as an "innocent infringer" un-
der 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). (3) Whether a P2P downloader is entitled to a trial
by jury on the question of statutory damages when a judge grants summary
judgment and finds the statutory minimum in damages. (4) Whether injunctive
relief is appropriate where a P2P downloader has "learned her lesson" and is
"unlikely to download copyrighted material again."
Holdings: (1) Because Gonzalez possessed copies of downloaded copy-
righted songs for which she owned no legitimate copy and she did so for no
"nonprofit education purpose," her possession of these songs do not constitute
fair use. (2) Because Gonzalez "readily could have learned, had she inquired,
that the music was under copyright," she does not qualify as an innocent in-
fringer. (3) Because BMG sought the minimum statutory award and no mate-
rial dispute of fact existed, the court lacked discretion in selecting a financial
award and could grant summary judgment. (4) The court held that injunctive
relief "remains appropriate to ensure that the misconduct does not recur as
soon as the case ends."
Discussion: Over the course of a few weeks, Cecilia Gonzalez downloaded
more than 1370 copyrighted songs using the P2P sharing program, KaZaA.
BMG sued Gonzalez claiming copyright infringement and requested summary
judgment, which was granted by the district court. Gonzalez argued that her
actions were protected under "fair use" or, in the alternative, she was an "inno-
cent infringer." She also claimed that her right to a jury trial was violated and
the granting of injunctive relief was an abuse of discretion.
When considering the defense of "fair use" the Court must factor "(1) the
purpose and character of the use ... ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work." Gonzalez downloaded entire songs that
are sold separately or as an album and the nature of her use was not nonprofit.
The court found the aggregate effect of P2P downloading on the market value
of songs substantial--contributing to a 30% reduction in music sales. And
while the downloaded songs in question lacked a copyright notice, Gonzalez
had access to legitimate tangible works and could have easily learned that the




BMG sought monetary relief pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), which permits
trial by jury on the issue of damages. However, when there is no material dis-
pute to fact, the court may enter summary judgment. Gonzalez argued that
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), allowed a
jury to go beyond the statutory minimum award of $750 and award $0. The
court did not read Feltner to sanction "jury nullification unique to copyright
litigation." The court found that a jury was not required because no factual dis-
pute existed and the court lacked discretion in awarding damages.
As to the injunction, the court found this issue ripe. "A private party's dis-
continuance of unlawful conduct does not make the dispute moot .... An in-
junction remains appropriate to ensure that the misconduct does not recur as
soon as the case ends."
Summarized by James A. Daniels
Cellco P'ship v. Hatch, 431 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2005)
Issue: Whether the district court erred in the partial denial of a preliminary
injunction against the implementation and enforcement of a Minnesota statute
due to preemption by federal law and whether any subdivisions of Article 5 of
that statute may be enforced independently.
Holding: The court reversed the district court's partial denial for a prelimi-
nary injunction and remanded for entry of a permanent injunction. The court
held that subdivision 3 of the Minnesota statute constituted impermissible rate
regulation and was preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 332. Additionally, the court held
that Article 5 should be enjoined in its entirety because other subdivisions are
not severable from subdivision 3.
Discussion: The court found that subdivision 3 of the Minnesota statute con-
stituted impermissible rate regulation and was preempted by federal law. Sec-
tion 332(c)(3)(A) of the Communications Act states that "[N]o State or local
government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates
charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service, ex-
cept that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating other terms
and conditions of commercial mobile services." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). The
court held that the Communications Act preempted the rate regulation in sub-
division 3 and that it did not fit into the "other terms and conditions" excep-
tion. Subdivision 3 requires that a provider of wireless telecommunications
services "notify the customer in writing of any proposed substantive change in
the contract between the provider and the customer 60 days before the change
is proposed to take effect." Minn. Stat. § 325F.695 (2005). The court held that
this sixty-day notification period "effectively freezes rates for 60 days." The
court concluded that the statute required providers to maintain rates that differ
from those charged under the existing contracts which would allow an adjust-
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ment of rates after reasonable notice of less than sixty days.
The court also rejected the theory that "subdivision 3 is a consumer protec-
tion measure" stating that "a benefit to consumers, standing alone, is plainly
not sufficient to place a state regulation on the permissible side of the fed-
eral/state regulatory line." This ensured that the subdivision would not fit into
the exception provided by the Communications Act.
Finally, the court held that the other subdivisions of Article 5 cannot be
separated from subdivision 3. The court noted that legislative history "shows
that subdivision 3 was the motivating force behind Article 5" and that the other
subdivisions "were conceived together as a unified effort to regulate wireless
providers." The court ruled that these subdivisions were intertwined and
worked together. Accordingly, the court remanded for a permanent injunction
of Article 5 in its entirety.
Summarized by Edmund M. Bender
In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, 396 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
Issue: Whether the government can obtain the physical address of a cell site
for call origination and call termination in real-time on a showing of less than
probable cause.
Holding: The government may only obtain real-time information about cell
site location on a showing of probable cause since the information that the
government seeks would reveal the location of a person at a given time. Be-
cause this procedure for gathering information is similar to a tracking device,
the government cannot escape meeting the more exacting standard of probable
cause.
Discussion: This case was heard on reconsideration from In re Application
of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap
and Trace Device, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
In this order on reconsideration, the court readdressed the issue of whether
the government can obtain the physical address of a cell site for call origination
and call termination in real-time on a showing of less than probable cause. The
government argued that the information sought in real-time is equivalent to
stored communications and subscriber records and the proper standard for ac-
quisition of such information should be governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2703. Pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), in order to obtain disclosure of these subscriber
records, the government must only present specific and articulable facts that
demonstrate the reasonable belief that that the information sought is relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
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The government set forth multiple arguments in favor of the lower standard
of proof. First, the government contended that once the information is commu-
nicated electronically, it becomes historical and thus falls under the statute
governing the release of records. The court disagreed with this logic for three
reasons. First, § 2703 pertains only to information that is already in existence
and not real-time tracking. The information being sought provides information
about where the cell phone user is currently located and is thus prospective in
nature, making obtaining this information very similar to a tracking a device.
Congress has spoken to the use of tracking devices and requires a showing of
probable cause in order for its use to be implemented. Second, if the govern-
ment's reasoning is followed to its logical end, the current super-warrant re-
quirement for wiretapping would easily be bypassed by the government be-
cause the information collected by wiretapping could also be considered his-
torical once it is recorded. Lastly, § 2703 only bestows upon the government
the ability to acquire records from telecommunications providers. In this case,
the government sought to intercept the information directly and bypass the
providers altogether. The court found this to be in violation of the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 121, which only provides for the
acquisition of records by law enforcement from telecommunications providers.
The government also maintained that the hybrid use of statutes authorizes
the collection of real-time cell site information pursuant to the lower eviden-
tiary showing. Currently, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 ("CALEA"), 47 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq., is the only statute that
speaks to the collection of real-time information. CALEA states that the mini-
mum burden of certification required for a pen register and trap and trace de-
vice is not sufficient for the acquisition of real-time cell site information.
Essentially, the government combined elements of CALEA with the PA-
TRIOT Act, the SCA, and § 2703-none of which spoke to the issue directly,
but together could be interpreted to govern the collection of real-time cell site
information: (1) the PATRIOT Act's expanded definition of pen register and
trap and trace device; (2) CALEA was amended to require only some showing
greater than that needed for a pen register and trap and trace device; (3) the
SCA only requires a specific and articulable showing; and (4) § 2703 author-
izes the collection of cell site information collected by the features of the
Pen/Trap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 206. Together, the government argued, these
statutes authorize the collection of real-time location information with a show-
ing less than probable cause. Since CALEA specifically states that certification
by a prosecutor is insufficient, the government argued that the next lowest
standard should be applied.
In addressing this argument, this New York court relied on a Texas court's
holding, In re Applications for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell
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Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). In that case, the
government presented the same four-prong hybrid theory to the court. The
Texas court held first that the expanded definition generated by the PATRIOT
Act was not meant to dissolve the CALEA restriction on the use of pen regis-
ters and trap and trace devices in attaining a person's location. Second, when
CALEA was amended to add the phrase "solely pursuant to" a pen register and
trap and trace order, it was not the intention to change current law. Legislative
history makes it clear that CALEA only applies to electronic surveillance tech-
nology and not to the legal authority of law enforcement to obtain such infor-
mation. Finally, neither the SCA nor § 2703 provide for acquiring information
that is prospective in nature, only information that is considered historical and
already in existence.
Both the New York court and the Texas court found that the procedure the
government desires to employ in order to acquire real-time information is the
equivalent of a tracking device pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) because the
movement and location of the person can be determined. The government is
required to produce a showing of probable cause for the use of tracking devices
under the warrant requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Summarized by Remy Savin
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